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Two Traditional Indian Models for
Interreligious Dialogue:
Monistic Accommodationism and
Flexible Fundamentalism
by Christopher Chappie
/I
Ν THE YOGAVASISTHA, A SYNCRETIC Hindu text of the
L / | tenth or twelfth century, an attempt is made to harmonize
C-x the absolute truth as articulated in a number of competing
systems, i n c l u d i n g various forms of Buddhism, Vedanta, a n d
Samkhya. This approach, which I call monistic accommodationism,
stems from a Buddhist-influenced, highly idealized form of Advaita
Vedanta.
From its beginnings, Jainism has been concerned with under
standing, respecting, and countering competing religious views.
Although acknowledging various forms of Hinduism and Buddhism
as offering partial truths, Jainism exhibits what I call flexible funda
mentalism, holding firm to its central teachings of jiva, karma, and
kevala while exploring other systems. In this paper, these two
approaches will be compared and contrasted with select modern,
Western approaches to interreligious dialogue.
India has given rise to multiple unique theological and philo
sophical perspectives. In the Vedic hymns and in later popular
Hinduism, we find a number of distinct gods and goddesses being
worshipped, in a process dubbed "henotheism" by Max Mueller.1 In
the Upanishads we find an interiorization of ritual, resulting in an
identification between the macrocosm {brahman) and the micro
cosm (atman), the foundation for later Vedan tic monism. However,
this emphasis on the "not-twoness" of things finds counterbalance in
the Samkhya and Yoga schools, which posit a twofold reality, with
one aspect in perpetual change (prakrti) and the other merely look
ing on (purusa). Later sects elevated one or another deity to nearly
monotheistic status, as in Vaisnava devotions to Krishna or Rama
and Saivite allegiance to Siva. All these traditions—henotheistic,
monistic, psychological/meditative, and devotional—claim a com
mon heritage in the Vedic texts, t h o u g h their interpretations
18
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diverge widely. Each of these perspectives can be loosely styled as
"Brahmanical."
In contrast to the Brahmanical models, two r e n o u n c e r or
Sramanic traditions arose in India offering yet two more philosophical positions. The Buddhists denied the abiding nature of anything,
either internal or external, and urged people to exert themselves at
quelling desire, establishing an anti-deity, anti-metaphysical system.
The Jainas posited a universe of countless, interchanging life forms
trapped by the effects of past actions, and proclaimed that the
release of the human soul is possible through the assiduous observance of an ethic rooted in non-injury to life.
U n l i k e t h e p r o p h e t i c m o n o t h e i s m t h a t arose from t h e
Mediterranean world, where one can speak of a single deity, and a
similar, if not common, covenant amongst Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, very little united these conflicting world views. Yet, each of
these systems, from the henotheistic Hindus to the atheistic Jainas,
has managed to flourish in India, along with Islam and more recent
traditions such as Sikhism. What has enabled this coexistence of
seemingly contradictory systems? What lessons does India offer for
the process of interreligious dialogue? How might contemporary
India, currently wracked with divisiveness caused by religious allegiances, benefit from an historical reflection on its earlier grappling
with the issue of plurality?
To answer some of these questions, I have chosen two texts, one
from Hinduism and the other from Jainism, that provide models for
respecting other traditions through reflective understanding.

The Yogavasistha
In the period during and immediately following Gupta rule (ca.
320-500 C.E.), India experienced an explosion of creativity in the
arts, literature, and poetry. The epic tradition had expanded
beyond the Ramayana and the Mahabharata into the Purans, and
the various forms of speculative Hinduism mentioned above found
new articulation and new audiences in the process. The sacred and
secret Upanishads and Vedas were retold by the sages of these texts,
and even the arguments raised by the Sramanas entered into the
discussion. It was within this c o n t e x t t h a t t h e seeds of t h e
Yogavasistha were sown, a text that reached immense proportions
(nearly 30,000 stanzas) and sought to address nearly all the systems
mentioned above.
B.L. Atreya argues that the Yogavasistha was written before
Sankara because it contains "too much Buddhism," 2 and places it in
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the sixth or early seventh century CE. Dasgupta thinks the author
was contemporary with Sankara and dates it in the seventh or
eighth centuries. 3 T.G. Mainkar, the most authoritative scholar on
this topic, claims that the work went through three major phases,
beginning with a work that was attributed to the sage Vasistha that
has since been lost, this text was then expanded into a text known
as the Laghuyogavasistha and finally into the Yogavasistha .4 The first
phase of the text addresses issues of karma and self-effort previously
found in the Mahabharata. 5 The second phase relies heavily upon
the Vijnanavada School of Mahayana Buddhism, particularly as
found in the Lankavatara Sutra. 6 The third phase reflects great
influence from the Saivite Trika school, particularly in its reference
to the "issuing-forth" (spanda) process of world creation. 7 The poetic style and luxuriant descriptions of the Yogavasistha draw from a
wealth of Buddhist and Hindu images and metaphors. Atreya has
written that:
[The author] has imbibed all that was best in Indian thought that
existed before him—Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina—and speaks from
his own standpoint.... 8

The great Marathis poet Jnanesvara (1275-1296 C.E.) was influenced by the Yogavasistha, making references to the text in both his
Amrtanubhava and his Jnanesvan. It also proved to be popular in
Muslim circles as a good text for explaining the essentials of Hindu
thought; it was abridged and translated into Persian at least nine
times.9
Despite his reliance on and inclusion of diverse voices within his
text, the unknown author of the Yogavasistha established a unique
hermeneutical position when dealing with the issue of plurality.
Earlier encounters between divergent schools of thought sought to
dispute and disprove the assumptions and conclusions of rival
schools. Sankara sharply criticized Samkhya for positing a multiplicity of consciousness (purusas), holding instead that pure consciousness is by nature single (advaita). Patanjali, in his \foga Sutra, seems
to attack the Mahayana Buddhist notion that all things are merely
inventions of the mind. The Buddha and later Buddhists rejected
the notion that any aspect of self is immortal, opting for a via negativa rather than assenting to personalist or essentialist language. The
Jainas dismiss the Hindus and Buddhists alike as extremists, as we
will see below. In the seminal texts of each of these traditions, no
allowance is made for the possibility that truth can reside in any system other than the one that it puts forth.
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In t h e Yogavasistha , however, we see a n e x u b e r a n t affirmation of
diversity. R a t h e r t h a n rejecting t h e B u d d h a as a nihilist or simply
ignoring him, as is often t h e case in H i n d u texts, t h e a u t h o r of t h e
Yogavasistha is quite familiar with t h e Buddhist emphasis o n r e n u n c i 
ation a n d praises B u d d h a ' s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of this state:
In that total renunciation does the highest wisdom or self-knowledge
exist: the utter emptiness of a pot is where precious jewels are stored.
It is by such total renunciation that the Sakya Muni (Buddha)
reached that state beyond doubt in which he was firmly established.
Hence, O King, having abandoned everything, remain in that form
and in that state in which you find yourself. Abandon even the
notion Ί have renounced a i r and remain in a state of supreme
peace. 10
Siding with what in m o d e r n times are referred to as perennialists,
the a u t h o r states that all accomplished mystics share t h e transcen
d e n t state of consciousness without an object:
It is a state of bliss that is not its description, which is both the 'is'
and the 'is not,' both something and non-something, light and dark
ness. It is full of non-consciousness and (objectless) consciousness. It
can only be indicated by negation (not this, not this). He became
that which is beyond description.
That state is the void, Brahman, consciousness, the Purusa of the
Sankhya, Isvara of the yogi, Siva, time, Atman or self, non-self and the
middle, etc., of the mystics holding different views. It is that state
which is established as the truth by all these scriptural viewpoints,
that which is all—in that the sage remained firmly established.11
This n o n d u a l e x p e r i e n c e is said to i n c l u d e within it all o t h e r pos
sible forms of expression. In t h e following passage, t h e a u t h o r clear
ly locates t h e Yogavasistha within t h e Upanisadic tradition, q u o t i n g
t h e adage "I a m t h e self of all," b u t t h e n uses language t h a t is dis
tinctly Buddhist in t o n e :
Once the realization that Ί am the self of air has arisen, one does
not again fall into error or sorrow. It is this self alone which is vari
ously described as the void, nature, Maya, Brahman, consciousness,
Siva, Purusa, etc. That alone is ever real; there is nothing else. Resort
to the understanding of non-duality, for the truth is non-dual; howev
er, action involves duality and hence functions in apparent duality.
The reality is neither duality nor unity. When these concepts cease,
12
the infinite consciousness alone is realized to be the sole reality.
T h o u g h t h e o p e n i n g lines of this passage express Advaita Vedantin
sentiments, t h e s t a t e m e n t that "reality is n e i t h e r duality n o r unity" is
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thoroughly Buddhist in character, demonstrating the author's skill
at synthesizing multiple traditions. Like such Christian thinkers as
John Hick, the author of the Yogavasistha seeks to establish a single
transcendent absolute upon which all expressions of truth depend.
In some instances he refers to this absolute in essentialist terms:
This is seen as the Purusa of Samkhya philosophers, the Brahman of
Vedantins, the Vijnaptimatra of the Yogacara Buddhists, and the
Sunya of the Sunyavadins.13
In other instances he uses the evasive style of the Madhyamika
Buddhists to avoid substantialistic truth claims:
It is neither sentient nor insentient, neither being nor non-being,
neither ego nor non-ego, neither one nor many.14
In this formula, similar to those employed by Nagarjuna, no positive
statement is allowed in regard to the ultimate entity.
I refer to this particular attempt to deal with multiplicity as monistic accommodationism. On the one hand, the Yogavasistha is committed to the notion that a single truth undergirds reality, as experienced by all mystics. On the other hand, it is sensitive to the unwillingness of the Buddhist tradition, which it holds in great esteem, to
characterize this reality. Consequently, it both "co-opts" Buddhism
by including it in sweeping declarations of parallelism, and upholds
Buddhism by employing its unique style of evasive language. In a
sense, the Yogavasistha does not want its cake, but it does eat it anyway. In order to reconcile the differences in various systems, it blankets them with incipient monism, while adopting non-monistic
rhetorical devices to explain both mystical experience and the "nonnature" of the absolute.

Flexible Fundamentalism in Jainismi Syadvadamanjari
The Jain tradition holds the practice of non-violence to be the key
to all spiritual advancement. For Jainas, the personal application of
non-violence extends to how one forms and holds opinions about
others who do not share one's own religious convictions. Two
devices assist in this process: the seven-fold aspect of Jaina logic, and
Jaina teachings about what are called "partial truths." This latter
approach will be compared and contrasted with the Yogavasistha9s
monistic accommodationism and modern models for interreligious
dialogue.
The fundamental teachings of Jainism state that the world is
divided into non-living and living components, that life forms have
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existed since the beginning of time in myriad forms, and that life
can be liberated through a fourteen-fold process. These teachings
have remained unchanged since their inception. In this regard, the
Jaina tradition may be considered "fundamentalist" in the sense that
its cosmology and ethics have not been subject to revision. However,
this fundamentalism is tempered by a fervent concern that the
points of view held by others not be dismissed but rather that they
be explored, understood, and then contextualized in the light of
Jaina doctrine.
The Jaina concern for understanding the traditions of others relative to their own is quite ancient. Record of it is found in the earliest
texts of the Jaina Canon. The Sutrakrta , included in the second section of Jaina canonical literature, critiques other systems of Indian
thought in light of Jainism, specifically those that seem to advocate
fatalism, eternalism, or vacuity. In the fifth c e n t u r y (C.E.),
Siddhasena Divakaras' Sanmatisutra investigates various viewpoints
as being non-valid when asserted in an absolutist manner. In the
thirteenth century, Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari offers a comprehensive critique of non-Jaina philosophical schools and religious
practices.
Jain logic regards all statements to be provisional. Any statement
could possibly be truth (syadvada). In the words of H.R. Kapadia,
this signifies that "every judgment that we pass in daily life is true
only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the
object considered."15 In the Jaina system, each truth is a partial one
(naya) and no one statement can ever account for the totality of
reality (anekantavada). Kapadia relates this stance to the practice of
non-violence:
When this ahimsa is allowed to play its role on an intellectual plane,
it teaches us to examine and respect the opinions of others as they,
too, are some of the angles of vision or pathways to reality which is
many-sided and enable us to realize and practice truth in its entirety.
This implies that ahimsa—and the Jaina attitude of intellectual ahimsa—is the origin of anekantavada. In other words, the Jaina principle
of 'respect for life' (ahimsa) is the origin of 'respect for the opinions
of others' ( ametamtavada) .16
For purposes of illustrating how Jainas have applied this method to
their approach to other traditions, we will now examine a few key
passages from the Syadvadamanjari of Mallisena. This text analyzes
the views of the Vaisesika "atomists," the Nyaya logicians, the
Purvamimamsa ritualists, the Vedantins, the adherents to the
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Samkhya system, various schools of Buddhism, and the Lokayata
materialists. Mallisena's text is ostensibly written as a commentary
on verses written by his teacher Hemacandra.
Sections IV through IX of the text critique the Vaisesika system.
The Vaisesikas are criticized for being inconsistent, on the one hand
asserting that a lamp is non-eternal while on the other, that space is
eternal. Within the Jaina system, as we have seen, no such inconsis
tency is allowed due to the teachings that atoms and space are both
eternal. Mallisena then explains the Vaisesika doctrine of a worldcreating god, justified by his omnipresence, self-dependence, and
eternity. The Jainas do not assent to the argument that a thing's
presence proves that it has been created; the maker of a pot can be
seen, so why is this creator-god invisible? If he is truly the author of
scripture, then why would he praise himself therein? Why would he
compose scriptures that contradict one another on the utility of ani
mal sacrifice and the necessity of a Brahman to have a son? The
Jaina position considers the postulate of a creator god to be unten
able logically and also states that such a notion weakens the per
ceived efficacy of karma.
T h e Nyaya logicians are criticized for their vagueness; the
Purvami mamsa is criticized for its support of sacrificial animal
slaughter. Vedanta's position on the non-duality of Brahman and the
non-reality of the world is examined and then attacked on the
grounds that if the world is not real then how is it that the world is
seen? O n e is not both a mother and barren." 1 7 Samkhya is criticized
on four counts: its notion that consciousness can be devoid of
object; that the buddhi (intellect) could be "non-intelligent," pro
claiming that Ί am not'; that sky is born from the subtle elements of
sound; and that the purusa is neither bound nor liberated. From
the Jaina perspective, each of these is contradictory.
T h r e e distinct schools of B u d d h i s m are p r e s e n t e d . T h e
Madhyamika is dismissed as not adequately disproving the existence
of either cogniser or cognition. The Sarvastivadin doctrine of
momentariness, wherein things come into existence, remain for a
moment, go into decay, and then cease, is countermanded by the perdurance of memory. The Yogacara approach to vasana (residues of
karma) is deemed inadequate due to its being based on the doctrines
of impermanence and no-self. The final system critiqued by Mallisena
is the Nastikas or Nihilists who proclaim nothing has meaning or pur
poses. As a retort, the author notes that there is "purity of intelligence
even on the part of one who has a body infected by leprosy",18 thus
advancing an alternate, optimistic view of human potential.
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In each of the instances mentioned above, Mallisena has clearly
summarized the various schools examined. The critique he presents,
while certainly not palatable from the perspective of those holding
the respective views being discussed, holds true to Jainism's sevenfold analysis of reality and rejection of extreme views. Each system is
acknowledged as a partial truth and hence validated, though not
applauded.
The Jaina technique of rehearsing and then abrogating the
"extreme" views of others, illustrated above in our cursory assessment of non-Jaina systems, provides an interesting contrast with the
Yogavasistha. The inclusivistic syncretism of Yogavasistha explicitly
integrates teachings of Buddhist momentariness with Vedantin absolutism. It attempts to combine the two extremes condemned by
Mallisena into a single vision, although it lacks the systematic framework such as the Jaina system of logic to accomplish this in a philosophically coherent manner. Although the Hindu approach that
advocates unifying multiplicity under the monistic umbrella has
been referred to by Western scholars as inclusivism,19 no such equivalent term occurs within the Yogavasistha tradition. The term inclusivist might seem to indicate that the variant positions included are
part of an overarching schematic, or answerable to some sort of central deity or monistic absolute. I would argue that syncretic
Hinduism seeks not so much to include divergent views but to force
divergent views to accommodate themselves to the core Upanisadic
monistic teachings on the identity of atman and brahman.
Both monistic accommodationism and flexible fundamentalism
illustrate that India has long grappled with an issue that has come to
the forefront in the West during the last thirty years: given the plurality of world religions that now come regularly into contact with
one another, what hermeneutic approach is the most valid? Will the
traditions more clearly define and maintain their integrity in light of
their contact with other traditions? Will traditions begin to meld
together, in the manner of late Hinduism absorbing aspects of
Buddhism, to the point where a discrete Buddhism disappeared?
The history of Christianity is replete with instances of both tendencies: inward-looking fundamentalism and outwardly-influenced
syncretism. On the one hand, the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon
were fundamentalist responses to movements within the Christian
community that were considered suspect: Arianism, monophysitism,
Nestorianism, etc. The creeds aim to establish a clear, unambiguous
definition as the foundation for Christian faith. Yet even the Gospels
themselves are clearly the product of two cultural sensibilities joined
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together, t h e Hebrew a n d the Hellenistic. Likewise, as with
Augustine and then with Aquinas, the insights of other cultures have
shaped and re-shaped the direction and orientation of Western
Christianity. With Augustine we see an ascendance of personalistic,
Neoplatonic, Manichaean religious forms; with Aquinas, thanks to
the Islamic translations of Aristotle, we see yet another re-writing of
the tradition. In each of these examples, the Christian faith seems
less interested in maintaining fundamentals than in accommodating
itself to new thought forms and issues.
Since the advent of rationalism, European colonialism, the rise of
the academic study of the world religions, and Vatican II, whole new
revelations have been made accessible to the Christian world. As
Thomas Berry has noted, the acknowledgment of and interest in
world traditions potentially signals an infused vigor within the realm
of theological discourse, unparalleled since the time of Thomas
Aquinas. With this new development have arisen great debates over
how best to proceed. In his book entitled No Other Name? A Critical
Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions, published in
1985, Paul Knitter offers a comprehensive survey of how various
Christian denominations and thinkers have assessed this situation.20
In some ways, this book, which describes itself as a textbook, is not
unlike Mallisena's Syadvadamanjari and hence provides a similarly
concise summary of a much larger body of literature. It surveys a
host of positions, including the positions that all religions are relative (Troeltsch), that all are essentially the same (Toynbee), that all
share a common psychic origin (Jung), that Christianity is the only
true religion (Barth), that revelation is possible in other religions
while salvation is not (Tillich), that all religions are ways of salvation
(Rahner). Knitter's own contribution attempts a new synthesis,
building on the theocentric model of Hick, Panikkar, and Samartha.
Of the various models offered in Knitter's survey, the combined
positions of Jung, Barth, and Tillich are closest to that of the Jainas.
Like Jung, the Jainas see a commonality amongst jivas: all hold the
potential for liberation (though some lack the ability to achieve it).
Like Barth, the Jainas are convinced of the sole effectiveness of their
own tradition in achieving their goal. Like Tillich, they agree that
partial truth is found elsewhere as well.
The solutions posed by Troeltsch, Toynbee, Rahner, and Knitter
himself are more problematic from the Jaina perspective. Radical
relativity would negate the efficacy of the Jaina system. Commonality
of traditions (Toynbee) flies in the face of the perceived content of
the respective traditions, as does the idea that all religions are ways
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of salvation (Rahner). Ultimately, however, the most troublesome of
these viewpoints from a Jaina perspective would be that of theocentrism, which, in the eyes of the Jainas, would remove the religious
process from human control; the Jainas refute the notion of any
external divine force and assert that all religious experiences
rescind due to one's own initiative.
In comparing the world view and method of contemporary ecumenists with that of the Jainas, there are both similarities and differences. Many ecumenists are searching for a unified truth, a basis for
one's own belief that shares a ground of commonality with the religious life of others. For the Jainas, this quest for common ground is
not the case. The Jainas are firm in their own belief structure: their
cosmology, logic, and ethics have remained unaltered for nearly
three thousand years and, as we have seen, Jainism clearly distinguishes itself from other traditions. In a sense, Jaina fundamentals
are unshakable. However, accompanying this certitude is a driving
concern to understand the beliefs of others, not to change themselves or even necessarily to convert others.
The work of contemporary Christian ecumenists, on the other
hand, is often exploratory, creative, synthetic, and sometimes syncretic. However, this adventurousness carries with it the possibility of
losing or altering one's own truths. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr has
pointed out:
Although based often on the positive intention of creating better
understanding of other religions, most of the proponents of ecumenism place mutual understanding above the total integrity of a
tradition to the extent that there are now those Christian theologians
who claim that Christians should stop believing in the incarnation in
order to understand Muslims and have Muslims understand them.
One could only ask why they should remain Christians and not
embrace Islam altogether.21
This is the inevitable conundrum of holding a logical system that
seeks truth in monolithic terms. Nasr himself clearly and self-admittedly operates out of a commitment to esoteric experience that
assents to the Vedantic and Islamic Sufi vision of oneness; in his perspective, all religions are seen through this prism. However, like the
Jainas (and unlike some ecumenists), Nasr defends holding strongly
to one's own perspective while simultaneously advocating the exploration of other expressions of truth:
The criticism that can be made against the religious exclusivists is not
that they have strong faith in their religion. They possess faith but
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they lack principal knowledge, that kind of knowledge which can
penetrate into foreign universes of form and bring out their inner
meanings.22
In this instance, a more sympathetic eye is cast on the foundations
of other traditions than has been evidenced by the Jainas.
Another approach, similar to the quest for commonality, has been
suggested by Leonard Swidler. Unlike Nasr's emphasis on the divine
or sacred as fundamental, Swidler offers an architectonic, "universal
theology" that, as its ethos, allows "full human life" and "ultimate
meaning."23 However, just as Nasr's solution may sound odd to the
non-theistic ears of a Jaina, so Swidler's appeal to a higher humanism might offend a Muslim because of its avoidance of God-language.
In this brief survey of interreligious encounters, three potential
outcomes can be discerned: conversion; accommodationist syncretism, often in the form of a monistic, super-inclusivistic metatheology; and renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism.
Conversion is one very real option: undoubtedly, some ecumenists have been converted unconsciously or in spite of themselves
and would protest such a label. As Ewert Cousins has commented,
one of the greatest challenges facing Christians who have had a genuine experience of Islam is to be able to return to the Christian
Trinitarian tradition: the monotheism of the Islamic faith is very
compelling and convincing. The emphasis on inferiority found within south and east Asian traditions also has been very attractive and
effective for many.
Accommodationist syncretion has been a long-standing practice
throughout Asia, with the interpénétration of Taoism, Buddhism,
and Confucianism in China, Korea, and Japan, and the successive
religious adaptations made in India when the Sramanic and Vedic
traditions merged, when Sankara infused Hinduism with Buddhism,
when Guru Nanak brought Islam and Hindu ideas together, when
Akbar formulated and instituted his Divine Wisdom religion, when
Ram Mohan Roy began to integrate the Christian gospels with all of
the above, and when Swami Vivekananda brought neo-Vedanta to
the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Within the
last decade, the New Age movement has introduced shamanic techniques into the melange. One difficulty with a "tradition" of this sort
(and this is meant to also include inclusive ideologies such as benevolent humanism), is that the rigorous study and logical consistency
that characterizes the "great traditions" becomes tenuous, though,
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as Raimundo Panikkar has pointed out, these matters should not be
the litmus test for spiritual experience: "a rationality does not
exhaustively define the human being." 24
Renewed or tolerant or flexible fundamentalism, preferred by the
Jainas, allows and, in fact, requires that the religiously informed person be well a c q u a i n t e d with how different t r a d i t i o n s have
approached the basic issues of human limitation and transcendence. It encourages respect for others' perspectives and yet allows
one's primary commitment to remain rooted in that with which one
feels most authenticated. It combines both perspectivalism and
apologetics, as advocated by Paul Griffiths.25
Fundamentalism is often viewed disparagingly as a blind devotion
to a fixed set of beliefs to the point of excluding all other views.
However, in order for a religious tradition to perform effectively,
certain world views need to be agreed upon by its adherents; understandably these at times come into conflict. The Jaina solution to
this dilemma is found in a logical structure that allows for and
respects myriad positions yet holds to its own cosmological and ethical view. Jaina beliefs and precepts have not changed in over two
and a half millennia, and yet Jainism survives with vigor in modern,
industrial India. As various forms of Christianity, Buddhism,
Hinduism, and Islam enter into dialogue with their own multiple
forms and with one another, new structures are needed to identify
what beliefs are essential and central to one's own subtradition and
tradition and how these may best be articulated and then related to
the traditions of others. The Jaina model of flexible fundamentalism
offers one option for validating a fundamentalist devotion to basic
teachings while still acknowledging the validity of divergent views
within their own context.
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